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VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTES ATTEMPTING
TO EXCLUDE RESORT BY FOREIGN COR-
PORATIONS TO FEDERAL COURTS.
I.
Statutes exacting an agreement that foreign corporations
shall not remvove a suit from a state court to federal courts as a
condition for doing local business within the state.
A state has the right to prohibit a foreign corporation from
doing business within its borders, unless such prohibition is so con-
ditioned as to violate some provision of the Federal Constitution.'
A statute providing that before a foreign corporation can do
business in the state, it shall appoint an attorney in the state on
whom process of law can be served, containing an agreement that
such company will not remove the suit for trial into the Federal
courts, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and
void, and any agreement made by a foreign corporation in pursu-
ance thereof is void.2 The Constitution of the United States de-
clares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to
all cases in law and equity arising under that Constitution, the la-ws
of the United States, and the treaties made or which shall be made
under their authority-to controversies between a State and citizens
of another State, and between citizens of different States.3 A cor-
poration is a citizen of the State creating it, within this clause of
the Constitution.4 The jurisdiction of the Federal courts under
this clause of the Constitution depends upon and is regulated by
the laws of the United States, and State legislation cannot confer
jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, nor can it limit or restrict the
authority given by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution.
Agreements in advance to oust the courts of jurisdiction con-
ferred by law are illegal and void. While the right to remove a suit
may be waived, or its exercise omitted in each recurring case, a
party cannot bind himself in advance by an agreement which might
be specifically enforced, to forfeit his rights to remove at all times
and on all occasions whenever the case might be presented5.
1Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246; Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; State v. Hodge, 169 S. W. 942.2 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445.
SArt. III, Section 2.4Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342; Railway v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 275.5Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Frear, 216 Fed. 199 (1915).
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Where a statute provides that the application by a corporation
for a permit to transact business in the State shall contain a stipu-
lation that the permit shall be subject to each of the provisions of
a certain act, and one of the sections of the act provides that, if
any cases commenced in a State court were removed by the corpora-
tion into a Federal court, the corporation should thereupon forfeit
any permit issued or authority granted to it to transact business
in the State, it has been held that such a statute enacts an agree-
ment not to remove a suit into the Federal courts, and, therefore,
is unconstitutional and void.5
II.
Statutes providing for the revocation of the authority of a
foreign corporation to do a local business in the State upon the
removal of such corporation of a suit from the State into the Fed-
eral courts.
In Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, the
question was whether a Kentucky statute which provided that "if
any foreign insurance company shall, without the consent of the
other party to any suit or proceeding brought by or against it in
any court of the State, remove said suit or proceeding to any Fed-
eral court, or shall institute any suit or proceeding against any
citizen of this State in any Federal court, it shall be the duty of the
Commissioner to forthwith revoke all authority to such company
and its agents to do business in this State," was constitutional, it
was held that if a statute provides that the foreign corporation
must enter into an agreement, before it can obtain a permit, that
it will not remove a suit into the Federal court, such agreement
is void and that part of the statute which provides for it is uncon-
stitutional, because it violates the provision of the Federal Consti,
tution guaranteeing the right to a trial in the Federal court. But
if the statute provides that upon a removal of an action to the Fed-
eral courts, the foreign corporation shall lose its right to do further
business in the State, there is no restraint upon the right to remove,
but it operates only upon the right to do business in the State and
the State has the sole power to deternine whether a foreign corpo-
ration shall do a local business within its borders or not. Mr. Jus-
tice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion, says:
5Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Frear, 216 Fed. 199 (1915).
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"As a State has power to refuse permission to a foreign insur-
ance company to do business at all within its confines, and as it has
power to withdraw that permission when once given, without stat-
ing any reason for its action, the fact that it may give what some
may think a poor reason or none at all for a valid act is immate-
rial.
"No stipulation or agreement being required as a condition for
coming into the State, and obtaining a permit to do business therein,
the mere enactment of a statute, which in substance says, if you
choose to exercise your right to move a case into a Federal court,
your right to do a further business within the State shall cease and
your permit shall be withdrawn, is not open to any constitutional
objection."
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. 166, the
court, in referring to this case, says:
"As the foreign corporation had no right to come into the bor-
ders of another State to do a local business, the court held that
the other State might deny it admission in the first instance, or
not having prescribed conditions in advance and merely permitted
the foreign corporation to remain on pure suffrance, where by
comity, it might, nevertheless, afterwards arbitrarily expel it for
removing a suit to the Federal court, or for any other reason or
motive which the State might deem sufficient. This is the sum and
substance of the Prewitt case. That case is far from deciding that
a foreign corporation may be expelled under any and all circum-
stances, at the mere pleasure of the State, and when taken in con-
nection with prior and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court,
it is clear that the case never intended to assert such a doctrine."
And the Court seems to be justified in its comment on this case.
A State may make its prohibition conditional, and oust a foreign
corporation at pleasure or prevent its coming into the State except
where its purpose is to engage in interstate business, or where the
foreign corporation is a Federal agent, provided that compliance
with the condition in order to do business in the State does not
necessarily deprive the foreign corporation of the right guaranteed
it by the Federal Constitution, or the State by revoking the license
of the foreign corporation does not impair the obligation of con-
tract, or deny the equal protection of the law, or infringe upon
some other provision of the Constitution.6 It is to be noticed that
in the Prewitt case, by the terms of the statute, the company never
lost its right to resort to the Federal court; it was always free to
do so, but the State made its act conditional upon the company's
doing so. And it is also to be observed that in that case and in
6 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Southern P. P. R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S.
400; Herndon v. Chicago R. I. and P. R. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135.
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the case of Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, which
it followed and affirmed, there were no property rights involved.
True that the insurance companies in those cases had expended
money in advertisements and in opening up and maintenance of
offices, but there was no outlay of money in the acquisition of prop-
erty such as in the construction of railroads, telegraph systems, etc.
This is a vital factor to be taken into consideration, 7 for when a
company makes such investments within a State, it becomes a per-
son within that State within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution, and thereby becomes entitled to
the equal protection of the laws of that State.8 And so, a State
officer will be restrained from revoking the license of a foreign
corporation in pursuance to a statute, where the foreign corpora-
tion entered the State and made heavy investments therein, and
later the statute was passed, which provided that the license of a
foreign corporation should be revoked if it removed a suit into the
Federal courts, because under this statute a domestic corporation
could remove a suit to the Federal courts without losing its license,
whereas a foreign corporation could not, and this amounted to a
discrimination by the State between persons within its jurisdic-
tion, and to a denial of the equal protection of its laws.0
"The equal protection of the laws," the court says in Southern
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, "means subjection to equal
laws applying alike to all in the same situation. If the plaintiff
is a person within the jurisdiction of the State of Alabama within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, it is entitled to stand
upon equal terms, to enjoy the same rights as belong to, and to
bear the same burdens as are imposed upon, other persons in a like
situation."
And where the attempted action of the State would be an inter-
ference with and burden interstate commerce, such a statute is un-
constitutional and void.10 The limited scope of the Prewitt case is
set out in Harrison v. St. L. and San Francisco R. R., 232 U. S.
318. In that case, an Oklahoma statute provided that the 'domicile
of every corporation doing business within that State, and which
had complied with or might comply with the constitution and laws
'Chi. R. I. and P. R. R. Co. v. Swanger, 157 Fed. 785.8 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1.9 Herndon v. Chi. R. I. and P. R. R.. Co., 218 U. S. 135; Southern P. Rlwy.
Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Frear, 216
Fed. 199.
'
0 Cases supra. and Harrison v. St. L. and San Francisco R. R. Co., 232
U. S. 318; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56.
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of that State, should for all purposes be the State of Oklahoma.
The second section provided for the immediate revocation of the
license or charter to do business within the State of a corporation,
which should claim or declare in writing before any court of law
or equity within the State, domiciled within another State or for-
eign country. The court interpreted the statute as forbidding a
resort to the Federal Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship
in the contingency contemplated, punishing by extraordinary penal-
ties any assertion of a right to remove under the laws of the United
States, and attempting to divest the Federal courts of their power
to determine, if issue should arise on the subject, whether there
was a right to remove. It held that the judicial power of the
United States as created by the Constitution and provided for by
Congress pursuant to its Constitutional authority, is a power wholly
independent of State action and which, therefore, the several States
may not by any exertion of authority in any form, directly or indi-
rectly, destroy, abridge, limit or render inefficacious. As the right
freely exists to seek removal unchecked or unburdened by State
authorities and the duty to determine the adequacy of a prayed re-
moval is a Federal and not a State question, it follows that the
States are in the nature of things without authority to penalize or
punish one who has sought to avail himself of the Federal right
of removal on the ground that the removal as asked for was unau-
thorized or illegal. A State cannot render the enjoyment of a
Federal right impossible by arbitrarily creating a fictitious legal
status incompatible with the existence of the right. The court said:
"The proposition that the constitutionality of the statute and the
action taken under it is supported by the decisions in Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co. and Security Co. v. Prewitt, is we think plainly
unfounded. Those cases involved State legislation as to a subject
over which there was complete State authority; that is, the exclu-
sion from the State of a corporation which was so organized that
it had no authority to do anything but a purely intrastate business,
and the decisions rested upon the want of power to deprive a State
of its right to deal with a subject which was in its complete con-
trol, even though an unlawful motive might have impelled the
State to exert its lawful powers. But that the application of those
cases to a situation where complete power in a State over the sub-
ject dealt with, does not exist, has been so repeatedly passed upon
as to cause the question not to be open."
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the recent decision of State
v. Hodges, 169 S. W. 942, gives a summary of the decisions on such
statutes in the following words:
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"As we understand, from a somewhat exhaustive examination
of the Supreme Court of the United States, there are at least two
lines of cases where statutes similar to the one in question have
been reviewed and passed upon by that court. In cases where
the foreign corporation has been admitted to do business in the
State upon conditions such as are prescribed in the statute under
consideration, and where such corporation is engaged in business
which is purely local or intrastate, if the corporation violates the
conditions under which it is permitted to come into the State and
to do business therein, its license may be revoked and the State
may thus exclude such corporation from doing business of a purely
local character within its borders. These cases hold that a State
may impose upon a foreign corporation as a condition of coming
into and doing business within its territory any conditions it may
see proper, provided that they are not repugnant to the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, and that conditions such as are
prescribed by the present act are not repugnant to the Constitution
or laws of the United States." The cases holding this view are
Security Mutual Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, supra, Doyle v. Ins. Co., supra.
"Other cases hold that where the foreign corporation has been
admitted and permitted to do business within the State, if such
corporation, although transacting a local business, is also engaged
in interstate commerce of the character mentioned therein, the
license of such cannot be revoked upon conditions such as prescribed
in the act. The latter cases hold that such conditions as those pre-
scribed in the act are repugnant and contrary to the Constitution of
the United States and laws made thereunder, and that as to a cor-
poration doing an interstate business the attempt to penalize and
restrain the assertion of a Federal right. Such are the cases of
Harrison v. St. L. and San Francisco R. R. Co., 232 U. S. 318, also
34 Supreme Court 333; Herndon v. Chi. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 218
U. S. 135, 30 Supreme Court 633, 54 Law Edition 970; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Supreme Court 190,
54 Law Edition 355, and other cases referred to in those.
"While the cases of Doyle v. Ins. Co. and Security Co. v. Prew-
itt, supra, are confined and limited to an extremely narrow scope,
yet they are clearly distinguished from the later cases referred to
and certainly have not been overruled by them."
III.
Estoppel of State from exercising its prerogative of preventing
a foreign corporation from continuing a domestic business within its
borders.
A State may be estopped from exercising its prerogative of pre-
venting, at its own pleasure, any foreign corporation from doing a
domestic business within its borders, by the acceptance by a for-
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eign corporation of the proposal made by the State in its own laws
and by acts done on the face thereof."1
So where the State statute provided that a domestic corpora-
tion may sell "all its property, roadbed, rights, and franchises" to
a foreign railroad corporation, and such property when so pur-
chased, "shall be subject, in all respects, to the laws of the State as
if owned by a domestic corporation," the provisions of such a State
statute enter into and form part of the obligation of the contract
made thereunder between the domestic railroad corporation and the
foreign railroad corporation, and the State cannot deny or impair
the enjoyment of the vested right gained thereby by the exercise of
its arbitrary prerogative."' 2 So where a foreign corporation has the
constitutional right to do business in the State,' 3 the same is true.
If a State has induced a corporation to enter it by the granting
of a franchise, which is in the nature of a contract, then it is pro-
tected in the enjoyment thereof by article I, section 10, of the Fed-
eral Constitution, prohibiting any State from passing any law im-
pairing the obligation of contract.1
4
When a foreign corporation has in compliance with an act of
the State, filed its charter, etc., and has become to all intents and
purposes a corporation of that State the same as if formally incor-
porated in that State, it acquires thereby the contract right to be sub-
jected by the State to only such treatment and liabilities as domestic
corporations, and such right is unconstitutionally impaired by the
passing of an act, which subjects it to forfeiture of all its franchise
and charter rights to do business in the State if it shall remove
any action into the Federal Court without the consent of the other
parties, no such restriction being placed on domestic corporations.' 5
D.B.
"Chi. R. R. & P. R. R. Co. v. Swanger, 157 Fed. 783; W. U. Telegraph
Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. 166.
12Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co. v. Railway Commission, 155 Fed. 792
(1907).
'sWestern Union Teleraph Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. 166.
14American Smelting Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103.
15Chi. R. I. and P. R. R. Co. v. Ludwig, 156 Fed. 152.
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